Learning about and from others' prudence, impatience or laziness: The computational bases of attitude alignment

Marie Devaine and Jean Daunizeau

PLOS Computational Biology, 2017, vol. 13, issue 3, 1-28

Abstract: Peoples' subjective attitude towards costs such as, e.g., risk, delay or effort are key determinants of inter-individual differences in goal-directed behaviour. Thus, the ability to learn about others' prudent, impatient or lazy attitudes is likely to be critical for social interactions. Conversely, how adaptive such attitudes are in a given environment is highly uncertain. Thus, the brain may be tuned to garner information about how such costs ought to be arbitrated. In particular, observing others' attitude may change one's uncertain belief about how to best behave in related difficult decision contexts. In turn, learning from others' attitudes is determined by one's ability to learn about others' attitudes. We first derive, from basic optimality principles, the computational properties of such a learning mechanism. In particular, we predict two apparent cognitive biases that would arise when individuals are learning about others’ attitudes: (i) people should overestimate the degree to which they resemble others (false-consensus bias), and (ii) they should align their own attitudes with others’ (social influence bias). We show how these two biases non-trivially interact with each other. We then validate these predictions experimentally by profiling people's attitudes both before and after guessing a series of cost-benefit arbitrages performed by calibrated artificial agents (which are impersonating human individuals).Author summary: What do people learn from observing others' attitudes, such as "prudence", "impatience" or "laziness"? Rather than viewing these attitudes as examples of highly subjective personality traits, we assume that they derive from uncertain (and mostly implicit) beliefs about how to best weigh risks, delays and efforts in ensuing cost-benefit trade-offs. In this view, it is adaptive to update one's belief after having observed others' attitude, which provides valuable information regarding how to best behave in related difficult decision contexts. This is the starting point of our computational model of attitude alignment, which we derive from first optimality principles as well as from recent neuroscientific findings. Critical here is the impact of one's ability to learn about others' covert mental states or attitudes, which is known as "mentalizing" or "Theory of Mind". In particular, this model makes two (otherwise unrelated) predictions that conform to known but puzzling cognitive biases of social cognition in humans, namely: "false consensus" and "social influence". It also shows how attitude alignment may eventually follow from the interaction between these two biases. Using state-of-the-art behavioural and computational methods, we provide experimental evidence that confirm these predictions. Finally, we discuss the relevance and implications of this work, both from a neuroscientific and economic perspective.

Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:plo:pcbi00:1005422

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005422

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