Magnitude-sensitive reaction times reveal non-linear time costs in multi-alternative decision-making

James A R Marshall, Andreagiovanni Reina, Célia Hay, Audrey Dussutour and Angelo Pirrone

PLOS Computational Biology, 2022, vol. 18, issue 10, 1-17

Abstract: Optimality analysis of value-based decisions in binary and multi-alternative choice settings predicts that reaction times should be sensitive only to differences in stimulus magnitudes, but not to overall absolute stimulus magnitude. Yet experimental work in the binary case has shown magnitude sensitive reaction times, and theory shows that this can be explained by switching from linear to multiplicative time costs, but also by nonlinear subjective utility. Thus disentangling explanations for observed magnitude sensitive reaction times is difficult. Here for the first time we extend the theoretical analysis of geometric time-discounting to ternary choices, and present novel experimental evidence for magnitude-sensitivity in such decisions, in both humans and slime moulds. We consider the optimal policies for all possible combinations of linear and geometric time costs, and linear and nonlinear utility; interestingly, geometric discounting emerges as the predominant explanation for magnitude sensitivity.Author summary: Analysis of decisions based on option value (e.g. which pile of coins would you like?) suggests that the optimal rules correspond to simple mechanisms also known to be optimal for perceptual decisions (e.g. which light is brighter?) But, crucially, these analyses assume that the cost of time is linear—when the more usual assumption is made that time discounts multiplicatively (e.g. ‘a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush (and so two in the hand are worth four in the bush)’) then optimal decision-making looks quite different—in particular, the theory predicts that decision-making should be sensitive to the absolute magnitude of the opportunities, such as coin pile sizes, under consideration, in a way that the optimal perceptual mechanisms are not. As well as the theory, we present novel experimental evidence from human decision-making experiments, and foraging slime mould, of precisely such magnitude-sensitivity. This is a rare example of theory in behaviour making a falsifiable prediction that is confirmed in two, highly divergent, species, one with a brain and one without.

Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.plos.org/ploscompbiol/article?id=10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010523 (text/html)
https://journals.plos.org/ploscompbiol/article/fil ... 10523&type=printable (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:plo:pcbi00:1010523

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010523

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in PLOS Computational Biology from Public Library of Science
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ploscompbiol ().