A Geometrical Perspective for the Bargaining Problem

Kelvin Kian Loong Wong

PLOS ONE, 2010, vol. 5, issue 4, 1-11

Abstract: A new treatment to determine the Pareto-optimal outcome for a non-zero-sum game is presented. An equilibrium point for any game is defined here as a set of strategy choices for the players, such that no change in the choice of any single player will increase the overall payoff of all the players. Determining equilibrium for multi-player games is a complex problem. An intuitive conceptual tool for reducing the complexity, via the idea of spatially representing strategy options in the bargaining problem is proposed. Based on this geometry, an equilibrium condition is established such that the product of their gains over what each receives is maximal. The geometrical analysis of a cooperative bargaining game provides an example for solving multi-player and non-zero-sum games efficiently.

Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:plo:pone00:0010331

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0010331

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