Topological Traps Control Flow on Real Networks: The Case of Coordination Failures

Carlos P Roca, Sergi Lozano, Alex Arenas and Angel Sánchez

PLOS ONE, 2010, vol. 5, issue 12, 1-9

Abstract: We study evolutionary games in real social networks, with a focus on coordination games. We find that populations fail to coordinate in the same behavior for a wide range of parameters, a novel phenomenon not observed in most artificial model networks. We show that this result arises from the relevance of correlations beyond the first neighborhood, in particular from topological traps formed by links between nodes of different degrees in regions with few or no redundant paths. This specificity of real networks has not been modeled so far with synthetic networks. We thus conclude that model networks must be improved to include these mesoscopic structures, in order to successfully address issues such as the emergence of cooperation in real societies. We finally show that topological traps are a very generic phenomenon that may arise in very many different networks and fields, such as opinion models, spread of diseases or ecological networks.

Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:plo:pone00:0015210

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0015210

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