How to Design a Targeted Agricultural Subsidy System: Efficiency or Equity?

Rong-Gang Cong and Mark Brady

PLOS ONE, 2012, vol. 7, issue 8, 1-12

Abstract: In this paper we appraise current agricultural subsidy policy in the EU. Several sources of its inefficiency are identified: it is inefficient for supporting farmers’ incomes or guaranteeing food security, and irrational transfer payments decoupled from actual performance that may be negative for environmental protection, social cohesion, etc. Based on a simplified economic model, we prove that there is “reverse redistribution” in the current tax-subsidy system, which cannot be avoided. To find a possible way to distribute subsidies more efficiently and equitably, several alternative subsidy systems (the pure loan, the harvest tax and the income contingent loan) are presented and examined.

Date: 2012
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0041225 (text/html)
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id= ... 41225&type=printable (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: How to Design a Targeted Agricultural Subsidy System: Efficiency or Equity? (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:plo:pone00:0041225

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0041225

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in PLOS ONE from Public Library of Science
Bibliographic data for series maintained by plosone ().