The Effects of Intrapersonal Anger and Its Regulation in Economic Bargaining

Emma C Fabiansson and Thomas F Denson

PLOS ONE, 2012, vol. 7, issue 12, 1-10

Abstract: Anger is a common cause of strained negotiations. This research investigated the effects of experiencing anger (Experiment 1) and regulating anger (Experiment 2) on ultimatum bargaining. Experiment 1 showed that relative to a control condition, angered participants proposed less fair offers and rejected more offers when bargaining with the person who angered them. Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1, and additionally showed that regulating anger via reappraisal and distraction both reduced anger. However, only reappraisal effectively reduced anger for the duration of the negotiation. Participants who reappraised proposed fairer offers than those in the distraction condition, but did not differ in offers accepted. This research may have implications for what emotion regulation strategy should be employed in economic bargaining. However, future research is required to determine the most effective timing and components of reappraisal for promoting beneficial outcomes in bargaining contexts.

Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:plo:pone00:0051595

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0051595

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