The Role of Opportunistic Migration in Cyclic Games

Pierre Buesser and Marco Tomassini

PLOS ONE, 2014, vol. 9, issue 6, 1-6

Abstract: We study cyclic evolutionary games in a spatial diluted grid environment in which agents strategically interact locally but can also opportunistically move to other positions within a given migration radius. We find that opportunistic migration can inverse the cyclic prevalence between the strategies when the frequency of random imitation is large enough compared to the payoff-driven imitation. At the transition the average size of the patterns diverges and this threatens diversity of strategies.

Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:plo:pone00:0098190

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0098190

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