Heartbeat and Economic Decisions: Observing Mental Stress among Proposers and Responders in the Ultimatum Bargaining Game

Uwe Dulleck, Markus Schaffner and Benno Torgler

PLOS ONE, 2014, vol. 9, issue 9, 1-9

Abstract: The ultimatum bargaining game (UBG), a widely used method in experimental economics, clearly demonstrates that motives other than pure monetary reward play a role in human economic decision making. In this study, we explore the behaviour and physiological reactions of both responders and proposers in an ultimatum bargaining game using heart rate variability (HRV), a small and nonintrusive technology that allows observation of both sides of an interaction in a normal experimental economics laboratory environment. We find that low offers by a proposer cause signs of mental stress in both the proposer and the responder; that is, both exhibit high ratios of low to high frequency activity in the HRV spectrum.

Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:plo:pone00:0108218

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0108218

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