Time Pressure Increases Cooperation in Competitively Framed Social Dilemmas

Jeremy Cone and David G Rand

PLOS ONE, 2014, vol. 9, issue 12, 1-13

Abstract: What makes people willing to pay costs to benefit others? Does such cooperation require effortful self-control, or do automatic, intuitive processes favor cooperation? Time pressure has been shown to increase cooperative behavior in Public Goods Games, implying a predisposition towards cooperation. Consistent with the hypothesis that this predisposition results from the fact that cooperation is typically advantageous outside the lab, it has further been shown that the time pressure effect is undermined by prior experience playing lab games (where selfishness is the more advantageous strategy). Furthermore, a recent study found that time pressure increases cooperation even in a game framed as a competition, suggesting that the time pressure effect is not the result of social norm compliance. Here, we successfully replicate these findings, again observing a positive effect of time pressure on cooperation in a competitively framed game, but not when using the standard cooperative framing. These results suggest that participants' intuitions favor cooperation rather than norm compliance, and also that simply changing the framing of the Public Goods Game is enough to make it appear novel to participants and thus to restore the time pressure effect.

Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:plo:pone00:0115756

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0115756

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