Algorithmic Mechanisms for Reliable Crowdsourcing Computation under Collusion

Antonio Fernández Anta, Chryssis Georgiou, Miguel A Mosteiro and Daniel Pareja

PLOS ONE, 2015, vol. 10, issue 3, 1-22

Abstract: We consider a computing system where a master processor assigns a task for execution to worker processors that may collude. We model the workers’ decision of whether to comply (compute the task) or not (return a bogus result to save the computation cost) as a game among workers. That is, we assume that workers are rational in a game-theoretic sense. We identify analytically the parameter conditions for a unique Nash Equilibrium where the master obtains the correct result. We also evaluate experimentally mixed equilibria aiming to attain better reliability-profit trade-offs. For a wide range of parameter values that may be used in practice, our simulations show that, in fact, both master and workers are better off using a pure equilibrium where no worker cheats, even under collusion, and even for colluding behaviors that involve deviating from the game.

Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:plo:pone00:0116520

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0116520

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