Smarter than Others? Conjectures in Lowest Unique Bid Auctions

Cancan Zhou, Hongguang Dong, Rui Hu and Qinghua Chen

PLOS ONE, 2015, vol. 10, issue 4, 1-13

Abstract: Research concerning various types of auctions, such as English auctions, Dutch auctions, highest-price sealed-bid auctions, and second-price sealed-bid auctions, is always a topic of considerable interest in interdisciplinary fields. The type of auction, known as a lowest unique bid auction (LUBA), has also attracted significant attention. Various models have been proposed, but they often fail to explain satisfactorily the real bid-distribution characteristics. This paper discusses LUBA bid-distribution characteristics, including the inverted-J shape and the exponential decrease in the upper region. The authors note that this type of distribution, which initially increases and later decreases, cannot be derived from the symmetric Nash equilibrium framework based on perfect information that has previously been used. A novel optimization model based on non-perfect information is presented. The kernel of this model is the premise that agents make decisions to achieve maximum profit based on imaginary information or assumptions regarding the behavior of others.

Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:plo:pone00:0122923

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0122923

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