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Walking the Straight and Narrow: The Moderating Effect of Evaluation Apprehension on the Relationship between Collectivism and Corruption

Zhen-wei Huang, Li Liu, Wen-wen Zheng, Xu-yun Tan and Xian Zhao

PLOS ONE, 2015, vol. 10, issue 3, 1-12

Abstract: Previous studies obtained mixed results regarding the association between collectivism and corruption. To make sense of the mixed results, the current research examined the moderating role of evaluation apprehension on the relationship between collectivism and corruption. Study 1, using a bribery scenario, indicated that collectivism facilitated corruption only when evaluation apprehension was low. Study 2, using a real money bribery game, confirmed the moderated model found in Study 1. Study 3 further demonstrated the different effects of vertical/horizontal collectivism on corruption. Our results suggest that a society may effectively combat corruption by increasing its social costs while, at the same time, retaining its collectivistic values.

Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:plo:pone00:0123859

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0123859

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