An Extended N-Player Network Game and Simulation of Four Investment Strategies on a Complex Innovation Network

Wen Zhou, Nikita Koptyug, Shutao Ye, Yifan Jia and Xiaolong Lu

PLOS ONE, 2016, vol. 11, issue 1, 1-18

Abstract: As computer science and complex network theory develop, non-cooperative games and their formation and application on complex networks have been important research topics. In the inter-firm innovation network, it is a typical game behavior for firms to invest in their alliance partners. Accounting for the possibility that firms can be resource constrained, this paper analyzes a coordination game using the Nash bargaining solution as allocation rules between firms in an inter-firm innovation network. We build an extended inter-firm n-player game based on nonidealized conditions, describe four investment strategies and simulate the strategies on an inter-firm innovation network in order to compare their performance. By analyzing the results of our experiments, we find that our proposed greedy strategy is the best-performing in most situations. We hope this study provides a theoretical insight into how firms make investment decisions.

Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0145407 (text/html)
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id= ... 45407&type=printable (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: An Extended N-player Network Game and Simulation of Four Investment Strategies on a Complex Innovation Network (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:plo:pone00:0145407

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0145407

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in PLOS ONE from Public Library of Science
Bibliographic data for series maintained by plosone ().