Perfect Information vs Random Investigation: Safety Guidelines for a Consumer in the Jungle of Product Differentiation

Alessio Emanuele Biondo, Alfio Giarlotta, Alessandro Pluchino and Andrea Rapisarda

PLOS ONE, 2016, vol. 11, issue 1, 1-26

Abstract: We present a graph-theoretic model of consumer choice, where final decisions are shown to be influenced by information and knowledge, in the form of individual awareness, discriminating ability, and perception of market structure. Building upon the distance-based Hotelling’s differentiation idea, we describe the behavioral experience of several prototypes of consumers, who walk a hypothetical cognitive path in an attempt to maximize their satisfaction. Our simulations show that even consumers endowed with a small amount of information and knowledge may reach a very high level of utility. On the other hand, complete ignorance negatively affects the whole consumption process. In addition, rather unexpectedly, a random walk on the graph reveals to be a winning strategy, below a minimal threshold of information and knowledge.

Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:plo:pone00:0146389

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0146389

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