The games economists play: Why economics students behave more selfishly than other students

Philipp Gerlach

PLOS ONE, 2017, vol. 12, issue 9, 1-17

Abstract: Do economics students behave more selfishly than other students? Experiments involving monetary allocations suggest so. This article investigates the underlying motives for the economic students’ more selfish behavior by separating three potential explanatory mechanisms: economics students are less concerned with fairness when making allocation decisions; have a different notion of what is fair in allocations; or are more skeptical about other people’s allocations, which in turn makes them less willing to comply with a shared fairness norm. The three mechanisms were tested by inviting students from various disciplines to participate in a relatively novel experimental game and asking all participants to give reasons for their choices. Compared with students of other disciplines, economics students were about equally likely to mention fairness in their comments; had a similar notion of what was fair in the situation; however, they expected lower offers, made lower offers, and were less willing to enforce compliance with a fair allocation at a cost to themselves. The economics students’ lower expectations mediated their allocation decisions, suggesting that economics students behaved more selfishly because they expected others not to comply with the shared fairness norm.

Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:plo:pone00:0183814

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0183814

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