Strategy intervention for the evolution of fairness

Yanling Zhang and Feng Fu

PLOS ONE, 2018, vol. 13, issue 5, 1-13

Abstract: The ‘irrational’ preference for fairness has attracted increasing attention. Although previous studies have focused on the effects of spitefulness on the evolution of fairness, they did not consider non-monotonic rejections shown in behavioral experiments. In this paper, we introduce a non-monotonic rejection in an evolutionary model of the Ultimatum Game. We propose strategy intervention to study the evolution of fairness in general structured populations. By sequentially adding five strategies into the competition between a fair strategy and a selfish strategy, we arrive at the following conclusions. First, the evolution of fairness is inhibited by altruism, but it is promoted by spitefulness. Second, the non-monotonic rejection helps fairness overcome selfishness. Particularly for group-structured populations, we analytically investigate how fairness, selfishness, altruism, and spitefulness are affected by population size, mutation, and migration in the competition among seven strategies. Our results may provide important insights into understanding the evolutionary origin of fairness.

Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:plo:pone00:0196524

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0196524

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