The effect of anchors and social information on behaviour

Tanya O’Garra and Matthew R Sisco
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Tanya O'Garra

PLOS ONE, 2020, vol. 15, issue 4, 1-19

Abstract: We use a ‘multi-player dictator game’ (MDG), with ‘social information’ about the monetary transfer made by a previous dictator to a recipient, to examine whether average contributions as well as the behavioural strategy adopted are affected by the first amount presented (the ‘anchor’) using a sequential strategy elicitation method. We find that average contributions are positively affected by the anchor. The anchor is also found to influence the behavioural strategy that individuals adopt, such that low anchors significantly increase the likelihood that players will adopt unconditional self-interested strategies, whereas high anchors increase the likelihood of adopting giving strategies. The distribution of strategies–and hence, the distribution of behavioural ‘types’—is therefore affected by the initial conditions of play, lending support to the notion that behavioural strategies are context dependent.

Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:plo:pone00:0231203

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0231203

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