The effect of copartisan justice ministers on human rights in presidential democracies

Joshua Holzer

PLOS ONE, 2020, vol. 15, issue 9, 1-17

Abstract: A body of literature suggests that states with independent courts are more likely to protect human rights. A recent article challenges this notion by arguing that when both the president and his or her justice minister share the same party—i.e., they are copartisans—that state is less likely to protect human rights, as justice ministers may value their loyalty to the president over their duty to enforce court decisions. In this article, I estimate government respect for human rights accounting for both copartisan justice ministers and an independent judiciary. In the end, I find copartisan justice ministers to be negatively associated with high government respect for human rights, even after controlling for judicial independence. Many constitutions already seek to ensure an independent judiciary, but if copartisan justice ministers increase the likelihood that governments repress, then perhaps constitutional engineers should also consider options that would reduce the likelihood that both the president and his or her justice minister share the same party.

Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:plo:pone00:0234938

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0234938

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