Reward and punishment in a team contest

Florian Heine and Martin Strobel

PLOS ONE, 2020, vol. 15, issue 9, 1-25

Abstract: A team contest entails both public good characteristics within the teams as well as a contest across teams. In an experimental study, we analyse behaviour in such a team contest when allowing to punish or to reward other team members. Moreover, we compare two types of contest environment: One in which two teams compete for a prize and another one in which we switch off the between-group element of the contest. We find that reward giving, as opposed to punishing, induces higher contributions to the team contest. Furthermore, expenditures on rewarding other co-players are significantly higher than those for punishing.

Date: 2020
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Working Paper: Reward and punishment in a team contest (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:plo:pone00:0236544

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0236544

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