Contrasting effects of information sharing on common-pool resource extraction behavior: Experimental findings

Dimitri Dubois (), Stefano Farolfi (), Phu Nguyen-Van and Juliette Rouchier

PLOS ONE, 2020, vol. 15, issue 10, 1-20

Abstract: This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different information sharing mechanisms in a common-pool resource game, with a view to finding a mechanism that is both efficient and inexpensive for the managing agency. More precisely, we compare the observed extraction levels produced as a result of three mechanisms: a mandatory information sharing mechanism and two voluntary information sharing mechanisms that differ in the degree of freedom given to the players. Our main result is that a voluntary information sharing mechanism could help in reaching a lower average extraction level than that observed with the mandatory mechanism.

Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:plo:pone00:0240212

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0240212

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