PSPAB: Privacy-preserving average procurement bidding system with double-spending checking

Li Li, Jiayong Liu, Peng Jia and Rongfeng Zheng

PLOS ONE, 2020, vol. 15, issue 10, 1-17

Abstract: Several organizations use auctions in a procurement bidding system to maintain a low procurement cost. Although several privacy-preserving auction solutions for different application scenarios have been proposed over the past few decades, none of them can perform efficient average procurement bidding while ensuring strong privacy protection for the bids of suppliers. To address this problem, we propose PSPAB, a lightweight, secure average procurement bidding system based on cryptographic tools, to provide full privacy for bids. In addition, this system allows the procurement manager to identify the users in the case of double spending. We formally prove the security of PSPAB under a semi-honest adversary model. Experimental results validate the theoretical analysis and practical application of PSPAB in real-world scenarios.

Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0240548 (text/html)
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id= ... 40548&type=printable (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:plo:pone00:0240548

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0240548

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in PLOS ONE from Public Library of Science
Bibliographic data for series maintained by plosone ().