Is there an ex-ante moral hazard on Indonesia’s health insurance? An impact analysis on household waste management behavior

Beta Yulianita Gitaharie, Rus’an Nasrudin, Ayu Putu Arantza Bonita, Lovina Aisha Malika Putri, Muhammad Abdul Rohman and Dwini Handayani

PLOS ONE, 2022, vol. 17, issue 12, 1-21

Abstract: The presence of ex-ante moral hazard could undermine the potential gain from expanding health insurance coverage in developing nations. To test the proposition, this study utilizes a nationally representative longitudinal survey with Indonesia’s health insurance for poor policy in 2014 as the quasi-experimental case study. The country represents developing nations that undergo a massive and rapid expansion of health insurance coverage. The empirical approach combines a matching and difference-in-differences method to obviate potential bias of the selectivity nature of health insurance provision and time-invariant unobserved factors. The findings suggest the presence of ex-ante moral hazard in the form of the less people using trash cans associated with the introduction of the subsidized health insurance premium. The results add empirical findings of a negative side effect of expanding health insurance coverage in developing nations.

Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0276521 (text/html)
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id= ... 76521&type=printable (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:plo:pone00:0276521

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0276521

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in PLOS ONE from Public Library of Science
Bibliographic data for series maintained by plosone ().