I win it’s fair, you win it’s not. Selective heeding of merit in ambiguous settings

Serhiy Kandul and Olexandr Nikolaychuk

PLOS ONE, 2023, vol. 18, issue 1, 1-11

Abstract: One’s willingness to accept an outcome or even to correct it depends on whether the underlying procedure is deemed legitimate. We examine a modified version of the dictator game, where dictatorship is assigned by a fair procedure that is linked to the participant actions but in effect is completely random, to illustrate that this belief is not independent of the outcome and is self-serving in its nature. We also discuss the perceptions of fairness and merit as potential drivers of the observed behavioral phenomenon.

Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:plo:pone00:0279865

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0279865

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