Stock price crash risk and military connected board: Evidence from Thailand

Sirimon Treepongkaruna, Pattanaporn Chatjuthamard and Arnat Leemakdej

PLOS ONE, 2023, vol. 18, issue 6, 1-13

Abstract: Based on the agency and stakeholder theories, effective boards, acting as an internal governance mechanism, reduce agency costs. This paper asks whether military connected boards represent a good governance tool by exploring how military connected boards affect stock price crash risk. Using instrumental variable analysis, we document that firms with military connected boards have lower risk of stock price crashes. Our findings are unlikely to have endogeneity concerns and shed light on the role of military connected boards as an effective internal governance tool. Consistent with the conservatism hypothesis and stakeholder theory, by being transparent about firm-specific bad news, military connected boards could effectively monitor managers to ensure they act on all stakeholders’ interests.

Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:plo:pone00:0281712

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0281712

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