An evolutionary game analysis of algorithmic indirect copyright infringement from the perspective of collusion between UGC platforms and direct infringers
Jiangang Liu,
Yuxuan Shen and
Lanlan Zhou
PLOS ONE, 2024, vol. 19, issue 5, 1-22
Abstract:
User-generated content (UGC) is developing rapidly as an emerging platform form, however, the problem of indirect copyright infringement by algorithms is becoming more and more prominent, and infringement governance has become a key act in the development of UGC platforms. When infringement occurs, recommendation algorithms expand the scope and results of infringement, while platforms choose to conspire with direct infringers for their own interests, making it difficult for infringed persons to defend their rights. In order to analyse the influence of different factors in the platform ecosystem on the subject’s behavioural strategies, a "platform-infringer" evolutionary game model is constructed, and numerical simulation is used to verify the correctness of the stable results. Based on the simulation results, it is concluded that the factors of uncertain revenue, punishment and reputation loss have important influence on the decision-making behaviour of the subject of infringement governance, and accordingly, the proposed measures on the publishers, platforms and the legal level of the government are conducive to the evolution of the system to the point of positive regulation and stability of rights protection, with a view to promoting the healthier and more stable development of the UGC platforms.
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:plo:pone00:0292571
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0292571
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