Research on risk management incentive strategy based on the green financial ecosystem

ZhongPing Cui, Shuang Lu and JinRong Liu

PLOS ONE, 2024, vol. 19, issue 4, 1-29

Abstract: Taking the green financial ecosystem composed of innovators, green financial institutions and regulators as the object of research, it explores the issue of how to improve the level of efforts of the three types of subjects and the benefits of risk management in the green financial ecosystem. The optimal level of effort, optimal level of return, and optimal level of return on risk management of green financial ecosystems for innovators, green financial institutions, and regulators under the three modes of No-incentive Contract, Cost-sharing Contract, and Synergistic Cooperation Contract are investigated and analyzed respectively, and verified by numerical simulation analysis. The results show: (1) Compared to the No-incentive Contract, the Cost-sharing Contract and the Synergy Cooperation Contract generate more significant incentives, and returns increase over time in both models. (2) The effort level of the participating subjects under the Synergistic Cooperation Contract is the highest, which can realize the Pareto optimization of the participating subjects and the green financial ecosystem at the same time. The study’s findings contribute to a deeper understanding of cooperation among innovators, green financial institutions and regulators in facilitating risk management in green financial ecosystems and provide a realistic reference for risk managers in green financial ecosystems.

Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:plo:pone00:0300629

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0300629

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