A Stackelberg-based repurchase strategy for rail freight options (BRFO)

Qi Shen, Tingyue Kuang and Jingwei Guo

PLOS ONE, 2024, vol. 19, issue 9, 1-16

Abstract: This study presents a novel Buyback Rail Freight Option (BRFO), leveraging Stackelberg game theory to enhance the strategic management of rail freight transactions. By integrating traditional buyback theory with a multi-phase trigeminal tree pricing model and parameter identification through a nonparametric Ito stochastic method, the research addresses key challenges of information asymmetry and market uncertainty. The proposed methodology emphasizes dynamic pricing strategies and market adaptation, constructing a Nash equilibrium framework within railway freight pricing. The findings suggest significant strategic benefits for railway enterprises, positioning BRFO as a crucial tool for improving competitiveness in the face of alternative transport options.

Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:plo:pone00:0307215

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0307215

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