Controlling shareholders’ share pledge and share repurchase notices of listed companies

Limei Cao, Xiaoyun Zhu and Jiani Xie

PLOS ONE, 2024, vol. 19, issue 9, 1-27

Abstract: States encourage listed companies to use stock repurchase to elevate the market value of listed firms. After China’s promulgation of the new Company Law in 2018, the number of listed companies that issued stock repurchase notices has increased, and the frequency is also increasing. But whether market value management is the real incentive for the action remains debatable. To reduce the risk of pledges, controlling shareholders may use stock repurchases to maintain the security of control rights, and stock repurchase notice may become a tool for controlling shareholders to manage pledge risks. From the perspective of pledge risk management, this paper selects the listed companies from 2012 to 2019 and finds that the share pledge of the controlling shareholder affects the stock repurchase behavior of listed companies by affecting the current pledge risk and the quality of information disclosure plays the interactive role between the two.

Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:plo:pone00:0308614

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0308614

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