From self-interest to collective action: The role of defaults in governing common resources

Eladio Montero-Porras, Rémi Suchon, Tom Lenaerts and Elias Fernández Domingos

PLOS ONE, 2025, vol. 20, issue 9, 1-21

Abstract: Managing shared resources requires balancing personal profit and sustainability. This paper reports on a behavioural experiment testing how extraction defaults—either pro-social or exploitative—impact resource extraction in a common pool resource dilemma (CPRD). We find that an exploitative default increases average extraction compared to a control without a default, while a pro-social default temporarily reduces extraction. The effects of both defaults are temporary, and extraction levels converge to those in the control group, with the pro-social default fading faster. Notably, the influence of defaults depended on individual inclinations, with cooperative individuals extracting more under an exploitative default, and selfish individuals less under a pro-social default. Our findings suggest that while defaults can promote short-term sustainability, their long-term effects are limited, and their effectiveness depends on individual traits.

Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:plo:pone00:0331348

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0331348

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