 Critical node identification and resilience analysis against cascading failuresAnqi Liu and Wenfu Zhao PLOS ONE, 2026, vol. 21, issue 2, 1-28 Abstract: Ensuring the robustness and resilience of critical infrastructure networks such as transportation and energy systems is a core security challenge for modern societies. Vulnerabilities in these networks often concentrate on a small number of critical nodes, whose failure can trigger catastrophic cascading failures. Therefore, accurately identifying critical nodes and formulating effective reinforcement strategies are crucial for enhancing the overall defense capability of the system. Existing graph neural network (GNN)-based methods often rely on topological centrality metrics, neglecting the distribution of node information and the impacts of cascading failures. To bridge this gap, this study constructs a comprehensive analytical framework (TEC-GNN, Topology-Entropy-Cascading Graph Neural Network) integrating graph neural networks, feature engineering, and resilience assessment. It aims to address two core questions: which graph neural network model is most suitable for critical node identification, and how to enhance network resilience by regulating redundant resource allocation. Systematic evaluation indicates that the GraphSAGE model delivers the best overall performance in critical node identification. Its results exhibit high consistency with supervised signals (Spearman’s correlation coefficient of 0.822), achieving a Normalized Discounted Cumulative Gain at Top-K (NDCG@K) of 0.918, an F1 Score at Top-K (F1@K) of 0.879, and a Top-K accuracy of 0.879. Its inference efficiency (0.002 s) is comparable to GCN and significantly outperforms GAT, meeting the demands of real-time analysis for large-scale networks. After feature dimension reduction via principal component analysis (PCA), the model’s discriminative power further improved, with effect size (Cohen’s d) increasing by approximately 4% without efficiency loss, validating the effectiveness of scientific dimension reduction. The model’s accuracy was robustly validated through attack experiments: selectively removing the top 10% critical nodes identified by GraphSAGE reduced the network’s largest connected component ratio (LCC_Ratio) to approximately 0.4, severely impairing network functionality. When the removal rate reached 20% (equivalent to 60% removal in random attacks), the network became nearly paralyzed. Another core finding reveals the complex nonlinear regulatory mechanism of redundancy coefficient β on network resilience. The resilience metric R exhibits clear diminishing marginal returns with increasing β: R rises rapidly as β increases from 0 to 0.5, then slows significantly with fluctuations thereafter. Based on this, the study proposes a “precision reinforcement” strategy: enhancing redundancy allocation only for critical nodes identified by GraphSAGE enables low-cost resilience improvement (e.g., R increases from 0.874 to 0.883). This strategy provides an efficient path for system fortification under resource constraints. The research framework proposed in this paper provides interpretable and scalable theoretical and methodological support for vulnerability assessment and resilience enhancement in critical infrastructure. The validated GraphSAGE model and “targeted reinforcement” strategy are particularly suitable for risk prevention and resource optimization in major infrastructure systems requiring dynamic analysis and rapid response, such as transportation and power grids. Date: 2026 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:plo:pone00:0344005 DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0344005 Access Statistics for this article More articles in PLOS ONE from Public Library of Science |
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