Extending pension coverage: Tax versus non-tax incentives
Joanna Rutecka-Gora (),
Jaroslav Vostatek () and
John A. Turner ()
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Joanna Rutecka-Gora: Warsaw School of Economics
Jaroslav Vostatek: University of Finance and Administration
John A. Turner: Pension Policy Center
ACTA VSFS, 2018, vol. 12, issue 2, 107-124
This paper compares the design, cost and effectiveness of three voluntary approaches for increasing pension coverage. The first facilitates plan features designed to attract workers. The second provides tax and other financial incentives. The third mandates autoenrollment of workers with opt out. The non-tax incentives of plan features in the United States have had little effect on increasing coverage. Generous tax incentives in Germany and Czechia have raised coverage but are costly. Mandatory autoenrollment with opt out in the United Kingdom has achieved the highest coverage rate of the three approaches.
Keywords: pension coverage; automatic enrollment; tax incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J26 D14 H24 H31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:prf:journl:v:12:y:2018:i:2:p:107-124
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