Redistribution Systems, Cross-Coalitions among them and Complexes of Memes Securing their Robustness

Radim Valencik () and Petr Budinsky ()
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Radim Valencik: Institute of Finance and Administration
Petr Budinsky: Institute of Finance and Administration

ACTA VSFS, 2009, vol. 3, issue 1, 29-47

Abstract: Analysis of the process of negotiations in redistribution systems shows two things: a) The negotiations process converges towards discriminatory balances, which are unstable. b) Which discriminating coalition will form can be decided by even a slight external influence, if it is not offset by another influence of this type. This opens the door to the discovery of the connections between the following phenomena – via the specific form of that, which decides about the performance of the players, the complementarity and rivalry of the players in the system, tendencies towards spontaneous advocacy of average and low-performance alliances, the “chaining” of redistribution systems, i.e., the creation of social networks of the cross-coalition type, the sensitivity of the negotiations process to imperfections of the negotiations process and the effects of exogenity, natural selection in the area of the survival of network structures formed on the basis of cross-coalitions among redistribution systems. The theory of redistribution systems can also be used in the analysis of memes and meme complexes that replicate in the communications (and thus also the negotiations) space, and restrict the rationality of the choice of some entities that are active in this space.

Keywords: game theory; theory of redistribution systems; coalition; negotiations; discrimination; meme; complex of memes; rationality and irrationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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