What are the Causes of Disturbances of Morality in Redistribution Systems

Radim Valencik () and Petr Budinsky ()
Additional contact information
Radim Valencik: University of Finance and Administration
Petr Budinsky: University of Finance and Administration

ACTA VSFS, 2010, vol. 4, issue 2, 140-162

Abstract: A redistribution system has two main attributes: 1. The greater the deviation of the payout of players from their performance, the greater the decline in the performance of the system. 2. The cause of this deviation is the formation of coalitions that treat their members preferentially and discriminate other players. If the players in these systems focus on the formation of discriminating coalitions, the system converges towards oscillating between discriminatory balances. But there is a strategy that leads to the attainment of a mutually acceptable balance, in which each of the players improves his / her position in comparison to the average payout that he/she would get when using a strategy based on the formation of discriminating coalitions. In systems of the given type this can be considered as the objective foundation of rationally justified morality. The stated finding is important and opens the way to revealing what in reality most prevents the attainment of a balance that is acceptable for everyone. It turns out that this factor is parallel redistribution games. The revelation of their role as well as their classification and description of some of them is of significant importance to managerial practice.

Keywords: game theory; redistribution systems; negotiations; coalitions; discriminatory balance; mutually acceptable balance; parallel redistribution system; rationality and morality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.vsfs.cz/periodika/acta-2010-2-03.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:prf:journl:v:4:y:2010:i:1:p:140-162

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in ACTA VSFS from University of Finance and Administration Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Magdalena Šebková ().