Pragmatism's Alternative to Foundationalism and Relativism

Jonathan Langseth

E-LOGOS, 2008, vol. 2008, issue 1, 19 pages

Abstract: In this paper I examine how pragmatism-in the works of Peirce, James, Dewey, and Rorty-rejects foundationalism while not resorting to "radical relativism," in which no is no justifiable claim for a belief. Instead of attempting to establish antecedent, a priori, or eternal principles that make evident truths, goods, or justifications thereof, independent of experience, pragmatists look towards the consequent, effective result of the maintaining of a belief as criteria for its claim as truthful or good. They emphasize trial and error experimentation and continual reflection/revision of beliefs given new information and experiences. I argue this basic methodology not only avoids the pitfalls of foundationalism, but also affords a method by which one considers the means or path towards any end as having value in and of itself.

Date: 2008
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