Infinitism and Dispositional Beliefs

Husein Inusah

E-LOGOS, 2014, vol. 2014, issue 1, 11 pages

Abstract: In articulating his theory of epistemic infinitism, Klein argues that a belief is justified only if it is supported by an infinite and non-repeating series of reasons subjectively available to the subject in a form of dispositional beliefs. Klein offers about three standard conditions of subjective availability of dispositional beliefs. I submit that the first condition confuses the disposition to believe with dispositional beliefs and the other two yield unpalatable consequences for Klein's theory of epistemic infinitism. Although this problem is not insurmountable, I argue that it poses a serious challenge to Klein's theory of infinitism and the only safe way out is a serious modification to his version of infinitism.

Keywords: infinitism; dispositional beliefs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://elogos.vse.cz/doi/10.18267/j.e-logos.366.html (text/html)
http://elogos.vse.cz/doi/10.18267/j.e-logos.366.pdf (application/pdf)
free of charge

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:prg:jnlelg:v:2014:y:2014:i:1:id:366:p:1-11

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Katedra filosofie, Národohospodářská fakulta, Vysoká škole ekonomická v Praze, Nám. W. Churchilla 4, 130 67 Praha 3, Česká republika
http://elogos.vse.cz

DOI: 10.18267/j.e-logos.366

Access Statistics for this article

E-LOGOS is currently edited by Miroslav Vacura

More articles in E-LOGOS from Prague University of Economics and Business Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Stanislav Vojir ().