Monopolistic credit market in the conditions of imperfect information

Karel Janda

Prague Economic Papers, 2000, vol. 2000, issue 3

Abstract: Imperfect information in the monopolistic credit market could lead to the rejection of credit provision to some applicants for credit. The choice of which class of borrowers is rejected credit depends on the relations among some characteristics of borrowers. The inefficiency of credit market could be alleviated by government credit guarantees.

Keywords: credit; monopoly; imperfect information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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DOI: 10.18267/j.pep.83

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