Coalition formation and eastward expansion of the european union (implications for the council)

Peter Silárszky and René Levínský ()

Prague Economic Papers, 2001, vol. 2001, issue 1

Abstract: In this paper we study the distribution of power in the Council of the European Union. The goal of this paper is to evaluate the implications of coalition formation and the entry of some Central and Eastern European countries on the voting power of the member states. The analysis is based on the Shapley-Shubik power index of simple cooperative games. Modified versions of the Shapley-Shubik index are used to analyze the influence of sub-systems of the EU on the distribution of power in the decision making process.

Keywords: EU enlargement; EU decision making; Shapley value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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DOI: 10.18267/j.pep.168

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