Voting Power Indicators in the European Union

Marek Loužek

Prague Economic Papers, 2004, vol. 2004, issue 3, 217-236

Abstract: The article is concerned with voting power indicators in the European Union and one paradox arising from them. The first chapter defines voting power indicators exactly. The second chapter defines the paradox of new members and introduces some examples. The third chapter specifies data - voting power indicators in the EU. The fourth chapter computes differences between old and new voting power indicators. The fifth chapter summarizes the frequency of the paradox of new members in total. The sixth chapter brings a conclusion.

Keywords: EU enlargement; voting indicator; index of power; minimal winning coalitions; game theory; quantitative analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C12 C43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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DOI: 10.18267/j.pep.240

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