Altruism, Paternalism and Transfers

Jerome Ballet, Philippe Meral and Dawidson Razafimahatolotra

Prague Economic Papers, 2009, vol. 2009, issue 3, 267-282

Abstract: Discussions regarding the form that state transfers should take generally focus on the relative efficiency of transfers in kind vis-à-vis transfers in cash. This article, however, proposes a different approach - to determine the optimal structure of a donation, i.e. its optimal composition. Hence, the problem no longer lies in attempting to figure out whether a donation in kind is either more or less efficient than a donation in cash, but rather, to determine, through various hypotheses relative to the agent's behaviour, the most preferable structure for the donor.

Keywords: altruism; transfer; paternalism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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DOI: 10.18267/j.pep.354

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