Permis de pollution et oligopole asymétrique

Ngo Long and Antoine Soubeyran

Économie et Prévision, 2000, vol. 143, issue 2, 83-89

Abstract: [fre] Nous montrons que quand des firmes polluantes sont des concurrents à la Cournot, elles peuvent avoir une incitation à utiliser des permis de pollution comme moyen indirect de coordonner leur production. Si les firmes sont initialement identiques, les échanges de permis peuvent conduire à un oligopole asymétrique. Le cas de firmes initialement asymétriques est aussi considéré. [eng] Emissions Trading and Asymmetric Oligopoly by Ngo Van Long and Antoine Soubeyran . We show that when polluting firms are Cournot competitors, they may have an incentive to use emissions trading to indirectly co-ordinate their production. If the firms are initially identical, emissions trading can create an asymmetric oligopoly. The case of initially asymmetric firms is also considered.

Date: 2000
Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.2000.6007
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.3406/ecop.2000.6007 (text/html)
https://www.persee.fr/doc/ecop_0249-4744_2000_num_143_2_6007 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_2000_num_143_2_6007

Access Statistics for this article

Économie et Prévision is currently edited by Ministère de l'économie, des finances et de l'industrie

More articles in Économie et Prévision from Programme National Persée
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Equipe PERSEE ().