Calcul économique et incertitude socio-politique: une procédure d’évaluation des projets publics
Robert Kast and
Stéphane Luchini
Économie et Prévision, 2002, vol. 156, issue 5, 73-84
Abstract:
[eng] Public Contract Bidding : Fixed-Price Contracts Amended by Change Orders or Incentive Contracts ?. French procurement contracts are usually awarded by fixed-price contracts. However, fixed prices can be raised by change orders that occur after the contract is signed. The authors develop a model of this procedure that gives an explanation for low-ball bidding strategies and cost overruns. Then the authors show that this procedure can yield an expected price lower than the optimal linear incentive contract of McAfee and McMillan (1986). [fre] Public Contract Bidding : Fixed-Price Contracts Amended by Change Orders or Incentive Contracts ?. French procurement contracts are usually awarded by fixed-price contracts. However, fixed prices can be raised by change orders that occur after the contract is signed. The authors develop a model of this procedure that gives an explanation for low-ball bidding strategies and cost overruns. Then the authors show that this procedure can yield an expected price lower than the optimal linear incentive contract of McAfee and McMillan (1986).
Date: 2002
Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.2002.6883
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