Bâle II: les risques de distorsions de concurrence

Dominique Garabiol

Revue d'Économie Financière, 2003, vol. 73, issue 4, 151-162

Abstract: [fre] Les biais prudentiels de Bâle I à l'origine de la réforme produisaient aussi des distorsions de concurrence, L'amélioration de la mesure des risques les réduit sensiblement, même si des distorsions nationales ou des arbitrages de modèles semblent pouvoir subsister. L'absence d'une reconnaissance des modèles internes limite, en outre, la réduction des distorsions favorables aux assurances ou aux banques d'investissement et défavorables aux banques diversifiées. Des distorsions affecteront également certains secteurs emprunteurs : pays en voie de développement, PME, private equity, financement d'infrastructures. La réforme libérera des fonds propres pour financer la croissance organique ou externe de certaines banques ou systèmes bancaires nationaux. Cet effet dépendra de leur profil d'activité. Globalement, ce sont surtout les grands groupes qui devraient en bénéficier. . Classification JEL : D4, D41, D42, D61, D62, E53, E59, F36, G21, G22, G24, G28 [eng] Basel II : unfair competitive effects . Prudential biases of Basel I, which prompted the Basel II reform, led to unfair competitive effects also. The Basel II improvement of risk measurement reduces them significantly but some unfair national playing fields and risk model arbitrages could last. Moreover, the lack of recognition of credit risk internal models will limit the reduction of the previous unfair competitive effects, which were profitable to non-banks or investment banks whilst damageable for diversified commercial banks. Theses effects will hit some borrower sectors too : developing countries, SME, private equity, project finance. Basel II reform will provide some banks or national banking systems with own funds leeway to be dedicated to internal growth or new acquisitions. This effect will depend on their business profile. Eventually, the reform should benefit mainly to the largest banking Groups. . JEL classifications : D4, D41, D42, D61, D62, E53, E59, F36, G21, G22, G24, G28

Date: 2003
Note: DOI:10.3406/ecofi.2003.5009
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