Representative Governments and the Formation of National and International Policies

Albert Breton

Revue Économique, 1981, vol. 32, issue 2, 356-373

Abstract: [eng] Representative governments and the formation of national-and international policies. Albert Breton. The paper presents and uses a simple model of government in representative democracies to model the properties of equilibrium agreements reached in international organizations, such as the GATT. The general conclusion is that if prior to « bargaining », the government of a country is in a state of equilibrium, such that the utility of politicians, given the relevant constraints, is at a maximum, then, after the « bargaining », these politicians will seek to undo, through the implementation of alternative policies, any part of an agreement that moved them away from the initial maximum. [fre] Un modèle du comportement de gouvernements démocratiques est utilisé pour étudier les caractéristiques d'ententes réalisées dans des organismes, tel le GATT. Le résultat principal est que si un gouvernement est dans un état d'équilibre, tel que l'utilité des politiciens est maximale, avant une entente, tout déplacement de cet équilibre engendré par une entente internationale sera « corrigé » par des politiques compensatoires qui essaieront de reproduire les propriétés de l'équilibre existant avant l'entente.

Date: 1981
Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1981.408596
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