Comportement stratégique et communication conflictuelle: le cas non coopératif

Herve Moulin

Revue Économique, 1984, vol. 35, issue 1, 109-146

Abstract: [fre] Les principaux concepts de la théorie des jeux non coopératifs (sous forme normale) sont passés en revue et discutés du point de vue des scénarios de comportement qu'ils formalisent. Le fil conducteur est la nature de la communication entre les joueurs. [eng] Strategic behaviour and conflictual communication : the non-cooperative case. Hervé Moulin. The essential concept of non-cooperatives games (in normal form) are surveyed and discussed with respect to their underlying behavioural scenarios. The type of communication among players plays the leading role.

Date: 1984
Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1984.408770
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