Information imparfaite et rationalité collective

Jean-Jacques Laffont

Revue Économique, 1984, vol. 35, issue 1, 163-176

Abstract: [eng] Collective rationality under incomplete information . Jean-Jacques Laffont. This paper discusses a notion of collective rationality when information is decentralized. It is claimed that the collective decision maker must elicit in an incentive compatible way the information privately own if he wants to use it. The concept of incentive compatible Pareto optimum is then illustrated in an example which analyses the normative properties of price revealing rational expectations equilibria. [fre] Cette note propose une notion de rationalité collective lorsque dans un système économique l'information est décentralisée. Il est postulé que l'agent collectif décideur doit obtenir de façon incitative cette information détenue privativement s'il veut l'utiliser. Le concept d'optimum de Pareto incitatif est ensuite illustré dans un exemple qui analyse les propriétés normatives de l'équilibre à anticipations rationnelles qui transmet de l'information par les prix.

Date: 1984
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