Le risque moral dans la relation de mandat

Jean-Jacques Laffont

Revue Économique, 1987, vol. 38, issue 1, 5-24

Abstract: [eng] Moral hazard in the principal-agent relationship. . Good risk sharing is one of the goals that an economic organization must achieve. The ability that some agents have to modify risk by taking actions non observable by other agents, the so called moral hazard problem, makes this task difficult. The purpose of this paper is to give an overview of the main results obtained in the principal-agent model to characterize optimal risk sharing rules. [fre] Le risque moral dans la relation de mandat. . Un bon partage des risques est une des conditions importantes que se doit de réaliser une organisation économique. Or l'aptitude qu'ont certains agents d'altérer les risques par des actions non observables par les autres parties que l'on a appelé un peu maladroitement problème de risque moral ou de hasard moral rend plus délicate la recherche de ce partage. L'objectif de cette note est de faire un tour d'horizon des résultats essentiels obtenus sur ce problème dans le contexte du modèle principal-agent.

Date: 1987
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