Fixation de l'objectif monétaire et réputation de la Banque Centrale

Patrick Artus

Revue Économique, 1987, vol. 38, issue 4, 807-836

Abstract: [fre] Fixation de l'objectif monétaire et réputation de la Banque Centrale. . On se demande, dans des modèles posés en termes de jeux, ce que doit être la meilleure stratégie d'une Banque Centrale lorsqu'elle annonce un objectif de progression de la masse monétaire. Faut-il afficher un objectif bas, ce qui réduit les anticipations inflationnistes mais dégrade la réputation de la Banque Centrale ? Faut-il absolument respecter l'objectif affiché ? [eng] The choice of the intermediate monetary target and the reputation of the central bank. . In that paper, the strategic game between the Central Bank and the private sector is analyzed. The issue of the choice of the preannounced growth rate of money supply is adressed ; is it optimal for the Central Bank to choose a low intermediate monetary target, which reduces inflationnary expectations but may imply loss of reputation if money supply actually exceeds the target ?

Date: 1987
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