Information asymétrique et émission d'actifs

Gabrielle Demange and Guy Laroque

Revue Économique, 1994, vol. 45, issue 3, 639-656

Abstract: [fre] Information asymétrique et émission d'actifs. . On dit souvent que les informations privilégiées dont disposent les dirigeants d'entreprise découragent les investisseurs potentiels et réduisent le volume des échanges sur le titre. Nous étudions la validité de cet argument sous des hypothè­ses usuelles en finance, dans un modèle inspiré de Grossman-Stiglitz [1980]. [eng] Asymmetric information and the flotation of companies . . The privileged information that the owners have on their firms is often said to discourage rational financial investors and to thin the market for their shares. The paper studies the validity of this argument in a model similar to Grossman-Stiglitz [1980].

Date: 1994
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Working Paper: Information asymétrique et émission d'actifs (1994)
Working Paper: Information assymétrique et émission d'actifs (1993)
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