Révélation de la fonction de bien-être du politique et instabilité de la fonction de popularité

Robert Marti

Revue Économique, 1995, vol. 46, issue 3, 879-887

Abstract: [eng] The revelation of policy maker's objective function and the instability of popularity function. This article examines the problem of the instability of popularity functions. The assumption according to which economic agents use information efficiently is advanced. Endowed with rationality, the economic agent would be able to reveal policy makers' preferences and to compare them with the policy announced. The popularity function would then benefit from information on the degree of credibility of future political decisions. [fre] The revelation of policy maker's objective function and the instability of popularity function. . This article examines the problem of the instability of popularity functions. The assumption according to which economic agents use information efficiently is advanced. Endowed with rationality, the economic agent would be able to reveal policy makers'. .

Date: 1995
Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1995.409701
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