Interconnexion de réseaux, qualité et concurrence

Edmond Baranes, Laurent Flochel and Claude Jessua

Revue Économique, 1996, vol. 47, issue 3, 467-476

Abstract: [eng] This paper focuses on the choice of the access charge by an operator through a decentralized mechanism. We consider an incumbent firm which operates as an upstream monopolist in the infrastructure market but faces competition as service provider. We examine the impact of a verticaly differentiated service market and analyse the conditions under which the operator may be induced to let other firms compete in the downstream market. [fre] Cet article étudie l'aspect stratégique d'un mécanisme décentralisé du choix de la charge d'accès par l'opérateur. On considère un opérateur en monopole sur les infrastructures, mais qui est en concurrence sur les services. On montre alors, dans un cadre de différenciation verticale des services, que l'opérateur peut avoir intérêt à laisser entrer le concurrent.

Date: 1996
Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1996.409782
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